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Introduction  
 
WHO Recommendation 8 urges Member States to regulate the cross-border marketing of 
unhealthy food. This concern has become even more pressing than it was in 2010 in light of 
the advance of digital marketing and other forms of marketing,
1
 which are inherently cross-
border and therefore more difficult to regulate at national level by States individually. 
However, cross-border marketing regulation will only be useful to Member States if it is 
sufficiently robust; if not, the risk is that it may hinder rather than support their efforts at 
national level.  
 
The EU provides a unique case study in light of the nature of the EU legal order and the 
powers it has been granted by Member States to ‘adopt the measures for the approximation of 
the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which 
have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market’.2 The adoption 
of common rules on the marketing of tobacco products demonstrates how far the tobacco 
control policies of Member States can be supported by the adoption of EU harmonising rules. 
Not only does the Tobacco Advertising Directive prohibits all cross-border advertising and 
sponsorship of tobacco products,
3
 but the Tobacco Products Directive
4
 also regulates the 
marketing of electronic cigarettes and imposes restrictions on the use of the tobacco packs as 
advertising tools. The constitutional legitimacy of both directives has been upheld by the 
CJEU,
5
 confirming that the EU has both the constitutional power and mandate to adopt EU–
wide standards on the marketing of tobacco products, so long as these standards are 
connected in some genuine way to removing barriers to the functioning of the internal 
market.  
 
Regrettably, however, the cross-border regulation of unhealthy food marketing paints a 
strikingly different picture. It is true that the EU and its Member States are not bound by the 
WHO Recommendations as they are by the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control. Nevertheless, the EU is under an obligation to ensure a high level of public health 
protection in the development and implementation of all its policies,
6
 including its internal 
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market policy, and its action should be guided by its overarching objective of promoting the 
well-being of its people. The EU has extensive powers to regulate the marketing of unhealthy 
food to children, and the evidence associating unhealthy food marketing with childhood 
obesity calls for a robust response at both national and EU levels.
7
 
 
This contribution argues that the EU has failed to adopt evidence-based policies intended to 
restrict the impact of unhealthy food marketing on children’s health. The key provision of 
relevance to this debate – Article 9(2) of the Audio Visual Media Services (AVMS) 
Directive
8
 – merely calls on industry actors to adopt codes of conduct intended to limit 
audiovisual commercial communications for unhealthy food in children’s programmes. As 
we will discuss in the first section, the gaps between the WHO Recommendations and this 
provision are significant, and the hope is fading that the EU is going to revise the AVMS 
Directive in a way that will offer more protection to children from the harmful impact of 
unhealthy food marketing. This situation is all the more difficult to grasp in light, firstly, of 
the research that the EU has commissioned and that supports further restrictions, and 
secondly, of the concerted effort that the public health community has made to ensure that the 
question of the impact of unhealthy food marketing on children was brought to the fore in the 
public debate and that the limits of the existing regulatory framework would be clearly 
exposed (I). 
 
In the complete absence of political will to adopt a robust EU-wide policy response, the 
question arises how Member States can implement the WHO Recommendations at national 
level. It is a basic principle of EU internal market law that, in the absence of harmonised 
rules, Member States retain their freedom to regulate the marketing of goods, services and 
brands on their territories, on the condition that they comply with the general free movement 
Treaty provisions, not least Article 34 TFEU on the free movement of goods and Article 56 
TFEU on the free movement of services. The second section of this contribution focuses on 
the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), with a particular regard 
for the limits it has placed on the freedom of Member States to regulate marketing practices 
to ensure a high level of public health. It will show that Member States do retain a wide 
margin of discretion to protect the health of their citizens, particularly the most vulnerable, 
but that they bear the onus of demonstrating how the measures they adopt are suitable to 
achieve the objectives that they have identified, in this case to protect children from the 
harmful impact that unhealthy food marketing has on their health (II). 
 
I. Restricting the cross-border marketing of unhealthy food at EU level 
 
After briefly presenting Article 9(2) of the AVMS Directive as the key provision relating to 
the regulation of food marketing to children (A), this section focuses on the unfolding 
revision process of the AVMS Directive, attempting to draw some key themes and tentative 
conclusions (B).  
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 A. Directive 2010/13 on Audiovisual Media Services and its failure to contribute to an 
effective implementation of the WHO Recommendations 
 
This section does not propose to rehearse in detail the legislative history of Directive 
2010/13. This has been done elsewhere.
9
 Suffice it to say, for our purposes, that Article 9(2) 
was inserted in 2007 as part of the EU’s obesity prevention strategy, thus recognising that 
food marketing contributes to the obesogenic environment responsible for growing childhood 
overweight and obesity rates.
10
 Since then, Member States have adopted the EU Action Plan 
on Childhood Obesity 2014-2020 which further acknowledges that unhealthy food marketing 
is part of the problem of childhood obesity and must be addressed.
11
 However, the EU’s 
response to unhealthy food marketing to date has largely been ineffective. 
 
The main provision of EU law purporting to address the exposure of children to unhealthy 
food marketing is Article 9(2) of the AVMS Directive which provides: 
 
Member States and the Commission shall encourage media service providers to 
develop codes of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial 
communications, accompanying or included in children’s programmes, of foods and 
beverages containing nutrients and substances with a nutritional or physiological 
effect, in particular those such as fat, trans-fatty acids, salt/sodium and sugars, 
excessive intakes of which in the overall diet are not recommended. 
 
Not only does this provision rely on the ineffective mechanism of self-regulation, as 
discussed more fully in the previous contribution to this Special Issue, but it also contains 
gaping holes which allow even more freedom to industry operators to define the scope of 
their codes of conduct narrowly, leaving a broad range of programmes, media and marketing 
techniques outside of the purview of the EU. This should not be read as suggesting that the 
EU should regulate all forms of unhealthy food marketing; this would infringe the principle 
of conferred powers, as the EU learnt when the CJEU annulled the First Tobacco Advertising 
Directive in 2000.
12
 Rather, we are suggesting that the EU reflect on how it should regulate 
cross-border marketing for unhealthy food.  
 
Article 9(2) and the AVMS Directive more generally fall short of implementing the WHO 
Recommendations in several respects, insofar as their scope is limited and cannot promote 
the comprehensive approach that Recommendations 2 and 3 call for. Firstly, by only referring 
to ‘audiovisual commercial communications accompanying or included in children’s 
programmes’, this provision is unlikely to significantly reduce (if at all) the overall exposure 
of children to unhealthy food marketing. As the UK case study below clearly shows, most of 
the television that children watch is outside children’s programmes; rather, they view family 
shows for mixed audiences. The fact that the proportion of children does not exceed 35% of 
the total audience, as per the EU Pledge, does not mean that many children in absolute 
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numbers are not members of the audience. The research that the EU commissioned on the 
exposure of children to alcohol marketing strong supports this assessment, in that it has 
shown that for children aged 4-14 the day part with the highest average hourly viewing rates 
was 17:00-20:59 in all nine selected Member States except Italy and Spain, where it was 
21:0023:59. The day part with the highest average hourly ratings was found to be the same 
for children 15-17 and for adults, namely 17:00-20:59 in the Czech Republic, Finland and the 
UK, and 17:00-20:59 in Austria, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain.
13
 
 
Secondly, many of the media that are used on a daily basis by children do not fall within the 
scope of the Directive. As we noted back in 2013, audiovisual commercial communications 
are defined in the AVMS Directive as ‘accompany[ing] or [being] included in a programme 
in return for payment or for similar consideration or for self-promotional purposes’.14 
Consequently, promotional messages appearing on social media platforms, corporate 
websites, and user-generated video publishing websites such as YouTube are not covered by 
the Directive, as they are not included in a ‘programme’.15 Despite the judgement in New 
Media Online confirming that the concept of ‘programme’ covers short video clips on 
websites, the need for commercial communication to be attached to a programme before it is 
regulated by the Directive excludes a number of promotional techniques that are increasingly 
used to promote unhealthy food to children.
16
 
 
Thirdly, the EU does not address marketing techniques that are particularly powerful at 
influencing children. In particular, no mention is made in the AVMS Directive of the use of 
celebrities, the use of licensed or equity brand characters, the offer of free toys...
17
 Only the 
use of nutrition and claims made on food is addressed at EU level by Regulation 1924/2006 
and requires prior-authorisation.
18
 
 
The fact that the EU has not defined some of the key notions it relies upon makes the 
effectiveness of Article 9(2) even more doubtful. Firstly, the EU has not defined the term 
‘children’, thus leaving significant leeway to the signatories of the EU Pledge to define a 
child as less than 12 years of age. However, this definition does not recognise the growing 
research which demonstrates that teenagers’ food preferences and consumption patterns are 
also negatively influenced by unhealthy food marketing. The EU-funded I-Family Study, 
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which concluded in February 2017, is unequivocal in this respect,
19
 and adds to the research 
that the second contribution to this Special Issue has presented. 
 
Moreover, by failing to adopt a nutrient profiling system, the EU has not provided any level 
playing field for the classification of foods into healthier or unhealthier categories. The 
question is left exclusively to the signatories of the EU Pledge (or to Member States that wish 
to exceed the minimum standard laid down by Article 9(2)). This failure does not come as a 
surprise, in that the European Commission never even fulfilled its legal obligation under 
Regulation 1924/2006
20
 to adopt a nutrient profiling scheme for the purposes of determining 
when nutrition and health claims can be made on food by the end of January 2009.
21
 
However, this failure is extremely problematic in light of the objective of the WHO 
Recommendations to restrict the marketing to children of unhealthy food to children, as 
opposed to any food.
22
  
 
In 2012, the Commission published its First Application Report on the AVMS Directive.
23
 
After recognising that ‘Member States must encourage audiovisual media service providers 
to develop codes of conduct regarding inappropriate audiovisual commercial communications 
in children’s programmes [for unhealthy food]’,24 the Commission called for ‘more effort 
[…] to create scale, support and best practice for codes of conduct on inappropriate 
commercial communications for [unhealthy food] targeting children. The effectiveness of 
such codes of conduct must be further assessed.’25 The starting point for the revision of the 
AVMS Directive had therefore been set very low indeed. Since then, however, one could 
have hoped that the issue would have gained some momentum following the adoption of the 
EU Action Plan on Childhood Obesity 2014-2020. The Plan acknowledges the ‘strong link 
between TV and screen exposure and adiposity in children and young people’ and called on 
the food industry to review and strengthen its commitments. In particular, it noted that ‘these 
efforts to restrict marketing and advertising to children and young people should include not 
only TV but all marketing elements, including in-store environments, promotional actions, 
internet presence and social media activities’.26 Even though Member States recognise the 
limited scope of the Pledge, they did not envisage in the Plan the adoption of any legally 
binding rules – self-regulation remains the credo of the EU’s response to the harmful impact 
of unhealthy food marketing on children’s health. The gap between the global and unanimous 
commitment made by Member States at the World Health Assembly in May 2013 to halt the 
rise of childhood obesity by 2025 and what they seem to be prepared to do collectively at EU 
level has never seemed so wide. One can only deplore that this gap is most unlikely to be 
bridged any time soon. 
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B. Fading hopes to witness the adoption of EU-wide legally binding and effective 
restrictions on the marketing of unhealthy food to children 
 
The Commission published a proposal for the revision of the AVMS Directive on 25 May 
2016.
27
 Referring specifically to the WHO Regional Office for Europe’s nutrient profile 
model,
28
 the Commission noted that ‘Member States should be encouraged to ensure that 
self-and co-regulatory codes of conduct are used to effectively reduce the exposure of 
children and minors to audiovisual commercial communications regarding [unhealthy 
food]’.29 As one could have expected following the 2012 Application Report, this proposal 
falls short of what is required to effectively protect children from the detrimental impact that 
unhealthy food marketing has on their health. 
 
Firstly, as far as Article 9(2) specifically is concerned, the Commission has not proposed to 
supplement the EU Pledge by any EU-wide legally binding provisions. Instead, it has 
proposed that its wording should be slightly amended to address ‘the exposure of children 
and minors’ to unhealthy food marketing, thus moving away from the narrow concept of 
‘children’s programmes’. As discussed above and in other contributions to this Special Issue, 
the focus on exposure is key. Nevertheless, without any binding EU-wide harmonising 
standard, the proposal to amend the wording of Article 9(2) is unlikely to change the 
approach that the signatories of the EU Pledge have adopted, requiring that at least 35% of 
the audience is made up of children. The stance of the Commission is most disappointing in 
light of existing research showing 1) the limits of self-regulation in contributing to positive, 
durable health outcomes; and 2) the importance of adopting comprehensive restrictions to 
unhealthy food marketing to ensure that industry operators do not shift their investment from 
regulated to unregulated programmes or from regulated to unregulated media. 
 
Beyond the provisions concerning food marketing specifically, the Commission also 
proposes to liberalise the provisions of the Directive on the placement of advertising. Two 
provisions are particularly relevant. Firstly, Article 23 would be amended to contain a daily 
limit on television advertising rather than an hourly limit as things currently stand: ‘1. The 
daily proportion of television advertising spots and teleshopping spots within the period 
between 7:00 and 23:00 shall not exceed 20%’. This means that a broadcaster will have more 
flexibility to decide when to insert advertising and teleshopping spots in television 
programmes within the limits set by the Directive. One could venture the hypothesis that this 
will lead to more marketing in programmes with high audience thresholds, and less in 
programmes with lower audience thresholds – with an overall increase in exposure to 
marketing. Apart from the impact that this provision could have on the quality of the overall 
experience of viewers across Europe who will have to potentially cope with more advertising 
breaks than ever before, one can legitimately fear that this provision, if adopted, will lead to 
more exposure to advertising, irrespective of the calls on industry operators to adopt codes of 
conduct to limit such marketing. This is all the more likely as the 20% limit does not apply to 
a) announcements made by the broadcaster in connection with its own programmes; b) 
sponsorship; and c) product placement. Exposure to various forms of marketing will therefore 
exceed 20% overall if programmes are sponsored and include product placement. 
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Secondly, Article 11 in the new version proposed by the Commission would further liberalise 
product placement. In the current version of the AVMS Directive, Member States have an 
option to ban product placement or not. It is true that the ban on product placement would 
remain in children’s programmes (as is currently the case) and would be extended to 
‘programmes with a significant children’s audience’. This reflects the concern that children 
often are exposed to marketing even in programmes that are not classified as children’s 
programmes. Unfortunately, however, the notion of ‘significant’ seems to lay down a high 
threshold which will in turn allow industry operators to continue to promote unhealthy food 
to children. This is particularly insidious in light of the report published on 25 May alongside 
the proposed revision of the AVMS Directive that children are affected by embedded 
marketing (focus of the study on online games) even though they do not always recognise it 
and that they openly declare not to like it. 
 
It is true that the Commission has recognised that ‘new types of content, such as short videos 
or user-generated content, gain increasing importance and new players, including providers 
of video-on-demand services and video-sharing platforms, are now well established’.30 
However, the proposal also specifies that ‘social media services are not included, except if 
they provide a service that falls under the definition of a video-sharing platform’.31 The scope 
of the AVMS Directive would therefore be slightly extended,
32
 but would still contain 
significant gaps, leaving major sources of unhealthy food marketing to children uncovered, 
notwithstanding their inherently cross-border nature. Furthermore, the Commission’s 
proposal does not propose to ban unhealthy food marketing to children on video-sharing 
platforms. Rather, it merely refers to Directive 2005/29 which bans misleading, aggressive 
and otherwise unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices, defining the notion of 
‘unfair’ too narrowly as to be interpreted as supporting an EU-wide ban on unhealthy food 
marketing to children.
33
 
 
Overall, therefore, the Commission has not taken on board all the evidence which has 
accumulated over the years on the exposure of children to alcohol marketing, including the 
evidence that it has commissioned itself. Its unshakeable, non-evidence based belief in the 
virtues of self-regulation is nothing short of ‘dogmatic’. The Commission’s reference to 
‘effective enforcement’ in the general provision it proposes to introduce on codes of conduct, 
‘including when appropriate effective and proportionate sanctions’,34  
 
The fact that ‘health’ is hardly mentioned as a public interest worthy of consideration in the 
case supporting the Commission’s proposal is most concerning, not least in light of the EU’s 
duty to ensure a high level of public health protection in the development and implementation 
of all its policies. It is clear that the Commission has paid lip service to this obligation.
35
 This 
is particularly problematic for Member States that are keen to ensure that children’s exposure 
to unhealthy food marketing is significantly limited. Is it not worth highlighting that the right 
to health is not mentioned alongside the right of commercial operators to trade, to property 
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and to expression? There is admittedly a brief mention of the right of the child but it is not 
fleshed out: despite claims that the Commission is going to take the best interest of the child 
as a primary considerations (as mandated by Article 24 of the EU Charter on fundamental 
rights), there is no evidence that this has indeed been the case in this instance.
 36
  
 
Civil society responded critically to the Commission’s proposal.37 Nevertheless, their voice 
does not seem to have been heard: despite its significant shortcomings, the Commission’s 
proposal is threatened to become even less effective in addressing unhealthy food marketing 
to children as the legislative process is unfolding. The final text that could ultimately be 
adopted at EU level may fall even shorter of evidence and be further diluted. ‘Cutting red 
tape’, even if it is to the detriment of our most vulnerable consumers, has become the sole 
concern of an ultra-liberal EU. 
 
On 10
th
 May, the Committee on Culture and Education presented its report on the revision of 
the AVMS Directive to the European Parliament.
38
 Apart from the continued emphasis on 
self-regulation and the proposal to suppress any reference to the WHO Regional Office for 
Europe’s Nutrient Profiling model,39 the Culture Committee has suggested that the 
Commission’s proposal be amended to remove any reference to ‘programmes with a 
significant children`s audience’ (and maintain the existing wording of ‘accompanying or 
included in children’s programmes’), as such notion is ‘neither clear nor legally sound, 
because programmes not initially targeting children, such as sport events or TV singing 
contests, may fall within this category’.40 Wasn’t the whole idea precisely to address the 
exceedingly limited scope of the AVMS Directive and ensure that children exposed to 
unhealthy food marketing during sports events or TV singing contests would be effectively 
protected from such exposure? This position is all the more difficult to grasp if read in light 
of the proposal to require that the codes of conduct on unhealthy food marketing ‘shall aim to 
effectively reduce the exposure of children to audiovisual commercial communications for 
such foods and beverages’.41 How does the Committee suggest that exposure will effectively 
be reduced if only children’s programmes are included in the scope of the EU Pledge? This is 
counterintuitive and flies in the face of existing evidence. Nevertheless, at its plenary session 
on 18 May 2017, the European Parliament gave a mandate to the Culture Committee to start 
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discussions with the Council on the basis of the amendments it had proposed to the 
Commission’s proposal by 314 votes to 266 with 41 abstentions.42 
 
The failure of the two rapporteurs of the Culture Committee, Sabine Verheyen and Petra 
Kammerevert, to act in light of the EU’s mandate to ensure a high level of public health 
protection is resounding. Even industry actors themselves, the supposed beneficiaries of the 
Commission’s mission to ‘cut red tape’, have called on the EU to do more in helping them 
determine what should be seen as healthier or unhealthier food. On 15 May, several major 
food manufacturers in the EU wrote an Open Letter to First Vice-President Frans 
Timmermans and other Commissioners jointly with major public health and consumer 
umbrella organisations urging the EU to ‘take decisive action’ and adopt an EU-wide nutrient 
profiling system for nutrition and health claims ‘without further delay’.43 Such a consensus is 
rarely seen in a policy area such as the regulation of food marketing where views have tended 
to be notoriously polarised.  
 
Another notoriously curious feature of the legislative debate as it is unfolding at EU level is 
the divisions that seem to reign within the Commission itself. DG CONNECT is in the 
driving seat and its approach to the regulation of unhealthy food and alcohol marketing to 
children suggests that, despite the wide amount of evidence it has commissioned as part of 
the revision of the AVMS Directive, it still has very little understanding of the health issues 
at stake which call for an EU-wide response. By contrast, DG HEALTH AND FOOD 
SAFETY seems to understand the limits of self-regulation in policy areas where real or 
perceived conflicts of interest are unavoidable. The tensions are palpable. The Commission, 
however, is bound to speak with one voice; and in the current climate of neo-liberalism, DG 
HEALTH clearly does not have the loudest voice – if it has any voice at all!44  
 
 
II. Restricting the cross-border marketing of unhealthy food at Member State level 
  
In the previous section we showed that the EU regulatory framework has failed to implement 
the WHO Recommendations effectively. As there is little hope that the revised version of the 
AVMS Directive currently under discussion is going to fill in the gaps that we have 
identified, this begs the question of the extent to which Member States can regulate 
individually the marketing of unhealthy food to children on their territories.  
 
In this section, we argue that Member States should be able to use the clause of minimum 
harmonisation allowing them to exceed the standards established at EU level to implement 
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the WHO Recommendations, and adopt comprehensive strategies to protect children from the 
harmful impact that food marketing has on their health. However, their freedom is subject to 
two legal requirements:  
 
- firstly, compliance with the State of Establishment principle45; and 
 
- secondly, compliance with EU internal market law, and in particular the general 
provisions of the EU Treaties on the free movement of goods and free movement of 
services, which constitutes the focus of this contribution. 
One of the most important challenges facing EU Member States is the costs and uncertainty 
that may be involved in defending the adoption of strong marketing restrictions intended to 
implement the WHO Recommendations. Any such action must take account of the legal 
requirements that Member States are subject to under EU internal market law.  
 
Although Member States are granted a broad margin of discretion to adopt measures which 
may be trade-restrictive in order to protect public health, the extent of this discretion is 
subject to the pivotal proportionality principle. After establishing that measures restricting 
food marketing may infringe the free movement provisions of the EU Treaties (A), we focus 
on the margin of discretion that the Court’s interpretation of the Treaty provisions has granted 
Member States, the evolution of the burden of proof which is placed on them when justifying 
their national measures, and the degree to which the imperative to protect children, and their 
health more specifically, bears on the proportionality analysis (B). The final part of this 
section evaluates the implications of the Court’s proportionality case law for Member States 
who, if they are to go beyond the scant provisions of the AVMSD in regulating the marketing 
of unhealthy food to children, must nevertheless do so in a way that respects their general EU 
Treaty obligations (C). 
 
A. Implementing the WHO Recommendations may require the adoption of trade 
restrictive measures 
 
The CJEU has broadly interpreted the scope of Articles 34 and 56 TFEU on the free 
movement of goods and services respectively, such that most restrictions on business 
practices that hinder or impede the free movement of goods or services – including many 
forms of marketing regulation – are likely to be caught.46 We must therefore carefully 
categorise the range of marketing measures that Member States could adopt, to establish 
which are likely to be caught by the Treaty and which may not. The Court’s case law has 
established four possible categories of measure: 
 
- Measures that discriminate based on origin (for example, a ban on the marketing of 
certain products on the ground that they originate from other Member States), which 
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always fall within the scope of the Treaty prohibitions and may only be justified in 
accordance with the derogations provided within the Treaties. Such measures are 
relatively rare and their justification places a high burden of proof on Member States 
because of their prima facie discriminatory nature.47 This would be the case if a 
Member State adopted a nutrient profile that would explicitly put its food 
manufacturers or producers at an advantage of other EU traders.  
 
- Measures that do not explicitly discriminate but rather impose requirements that 
create a double regulatory burden for imported goods, which are always considered 
indirectly discriminatory and are therefore caught by the treaty prohibitions.48 For 
example, marketing restrictions requiring changes in labelling or packaging,49 or 
which prohibits promotional content or gifts50 would fall within this category.  
 
- Measures that place requirements on goods which are not discriminatory and which 
do not implicate cross-border movement in any way. These are measures that are 
outside the scope of the EU’s internal market harmonisation powers, such as the 
regulation of adverts on ‘posters, parasols, ashtrays and other articles used in hotels, 
restaurants and cafés, and the prohibition of advertising spots in cinemas’.51 These 
measures fall outside the scope of the EU Treaties altogether and do not have to be 
justified by Member States to be maintained.52 For example, in Hünermund the CJEU 
concluded that a ban on advertising outside pharmacies would ‘not affect the 
marketing of goods from other Member States differently from that of domestic 
products’.53 In particular, Member States should therefore be able to regulate in-
school marketing without triggering their EU free movement obligations, thus 
implementing WHO Recommendation 5 that requires that ‘settings where children 
gather’ should be free from unhealthy food marketing. 
 
- The fourth category is significantly more difficult to define. It relates to the many 
marketing restrictions that do not impose any obvious barriers on intra-EU trade but 
nonetheless restrict market access. For example, if a country adopts television 
advertising restrictions, the question arises whether this measure – which seems to 
apply to all traders – does actually apply equally in law and in fact to them all or 
whether it puts foreign traders at a disadvantage. Regarding goods, even though a 
marketing measure may constitute a Keck selling arrangement and therefore fall 
prima facie outside the scope of Article 34 TFEU,54 it may still be caught on the basis 
that marketing restrictions can have an indirectly discriminatory effect on the free 
movement of goods, even if applied equally in law. Advocate General Jacobs 
observed in his Opinion in Leclerc-Siplec that: 
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‘in a developed market economy based on free competition the role of 
advertising is fundamental. Advertising is the means by which manufacturers 
and distributors of goods, and providers of services, seek to persuade 
consumers that their goods or services are worth buying … Without 
advertising it would be extremely difficult for a manufacturer located in one 
Member State to penetrate the market in another Member State’.55  
 
Following this reasoning, the CJEU has concluded that ‘the possibility cannot be 
ruled out that to compel a producer to discontinue an advertising scheme which he 
considers to be particularly effective may constitute an obstacle to imports’.56 The 
position is similar for services. In Gourmet the Court held that a ban on advertising 
‘even if it is non-discriminatory, has a particular effect on the cross-border supply of 
advertising space, given the international nature of the advertising market in the 
category of products to which the prohibition relates, and thereby constitutes a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services’.57 Therefore, marketing measures 
which only have a potential and indirect influence upon the free movement of goods 
and/or services might still breach the treaties and require justification.58  
 
Thus, the position currently appears to be that the CJEU will assume that any marketing 
measure with cross-border implications should fall within the scope of either Article 34 or 56 
TFEU. Recently the CJEU even seems to be applying a pure market access test to public 
health measures, holding that measures such as the minimum unit pricing measure in Scotch 
Whisky59 fall within the scope of the free movement provisions without even categorising the 
restriction in question.60 This adds further weight to the presumption that a broad range of 
marketing measures will be caught by the Treaty.61  
 
The significance of this for Member States wishing to implement the stricter regulations 
called for by the WHO Recommendations should not be understated. If a Member State’s 
marketing measure is caught by the Treaty prohibitions, the Member State must be prepared 
to explain why a restriction to free trade – even one that is only indirect and completely 
unintentional – should be tolerated, even if that restriction is created by the pursuit of public 
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health objectives. This places the burden of proof on Member States to produce evidence to 
legitimate the regulatory choice that they have made.62 This process is all the more 
burdensome given that the CJEU is devoting increasing attention to proof and evidence in its 
review of justifications,63 as discussed below.  
 
In summary, the CJEU’s case law on the scope of Article 34 and 56 TFEU places Member 
States in a difficult position. On the one hand, they are expected to enact measures to restrict 
the marketing of unhealthy food to children (the WHO Recommendations). On the other, they 
are prohibited from enacting marketing measures that restrict intra-Union trade in goods and 
services (Articles 34 and 56 TFEU), except if they can explain how the measure’s public 
health objectives can justify its trade-restrictive effects. This can be highly burdensome.64 
However, in the next subsection we argue that Member States should not be discouraged 
from implementing the Recommendations. The justification of a trade-restrict marketing 
measure depends on the proportionality of a measure – and the case law of the CJEU is 
relatively clear on the fact that demonstrating proportionality turns on the production of 
evidence, of which plenty has accumulated to support the adoption of strong restrictions on 
unhealthy food marketing to children. 
 
B. The proportionality of trade-restrictive controls on unhealthy food marketing to 
children 
 
If a trade-restrictive measure pursues one of the legitimate objectives set out in Article 36 
TFEU or the mandatory requirement/objectives of general interest doctrine, and is compliant 
with the principle of proportionality, it may remain in place as a justified restriction on intra-
EU trade. If these conditions are not met, the measure will be unjustified, and the restriction 
on trade will have to be removed.  
 
It is well established that measures which seek to restrict the marketing of goods or services 
on public health grounds pursue a public interest objective. The connection between 
advertising restrictions generally and the protection of consumers and public health was 
established in several cases, not least Commission v France (Loi Evin)65 and Gourmet,66 
while the connection between food labelling requirements and the protection of consumer and 
public health was established in cases such as Van der Veldt67 and Solgar Vitamin’s.68 In light 
of the evidence base supporting the WHO Recommendations (as summarised in the second 
contribution to this Special Issue),69 it should now be relatively uncontentious that national 
measures imposing restrictions on unhealthy food marketing to protect children’s health 
pursue a legitimate objective.   
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 The Court’s case law recognises that Member States benefit from a broad margin of 
discretion as to how they pursue legitimate public health protection objectives, and that their 
discretion may be exercised ‘having regard to the particular social circumstances and to the 
importance attached by those States’70 to the public health objective. 
 
This is not to say, however, that this discretion is unlimited. Even though Member States are 
primarily responsible for the health of their citizens, the fact remains that ‘the burden of 
proving circumstances justifying a derogation from the principle of the free movement of 
goods rests on[them]’.71 Discharging this burden of proof requires that the Member State 
concerned establishes that the measure complies with the principle of proportionality. 
 
To be proportionate, a measure must be ‘appropriate to secure the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue and not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it’.72  While several 
efforts have already been made at national level to regulate unhealthy food marketing to 
children, as discussed in this Special Issue, none have adopted broad statutory prohibitions on 
such marketing which would amount to a comprehensive approach according to WHO 
Recommendations 2 and 3. As the CJEU has not had the occasion to examine the 
proportionality of national food marketing restrictions with the EU Treaty, we analyses 
relevant CJEU case law on marketing, food regulation, and the protection of children, to 
explore how such measures could be assessed.  
 
The intensity of the CJEU’s proportionality review depends on the severity of the restriction 
placed upon trade. For total bans on advertising, the burden of proof resting on the Member 
States is high – this much is evident from the rulings in Douwe Egberts and Dextro Energy.73 
However, the case law that deals directly with total advertising bans, as in De Agostini and in 
Gourmet, does not indicate that such a measure can never be justified. Rather, these cases 
have simply indicated that the referring national court is to have the final say on 
proportionality, and that total advertising bans are not contrary to Article 34 ‘unless it is 
apparent that, in the circumstances of law and of fact which characterise the situation in the 
Member State concerned, the protection of public health against the harmful effects of 
alcohol can be ensured by measures having less effect on intra-Community trade’.74 While 
the Swedish court in Gourmet proceeded to hold that the impugned ban on alcohol 
advertising across a range of media was disproportionate, the most that this tells us is that the 
fate of a total ban on advertising is determined by the ability of the Member State to show, 
with evidence, that another measure would not achieve the public health objectives sought as 
effectively.  
 
The Scotch Whisky litigation provides an excellent example – the Scottish government may 
not have framed its minimum unit pricing measure or presented its evidence as effectively as 
it could have done before the CJEU, resulting in an ambivalent decision on proportionality. 
Before the Inner House of the Court of session however, the Scottish government was given 
the opportunity to revise and renew its presentation of the evidence base, and as a result the 
Inner House delivered a judgement that was highly supportive of the proportionality of the 
measure. Thus, for any stringent public health measure, whether it be total bans on 
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advertising or setting price floors, the proportionality of measures is determined though 
engagement with evidence. When it comes to implementing the WHO Recommendations 
then, the fact that the measures suggested would target unhealthy food marketing – the public 
health impact of which is the subject of extensive evidence – would favour arguments that 
such measures are proportionate. 
 
Less stringent measures, such as partial bans on advertising, are by contrast viewed as more 
proportionate. For example, in Commission v France (Loi Evin) the CJEU held that a ban on 
television advertising of alcohol was appropriate and necessary to achieve the objective of 
public health protection,75 and that ‘restricting the scope of that prohibition, reduces the 
impediment to the freedom to provide services and makes it therefore more proportionate to 
the objective pursued’.76 Where less stringent or partial prohibitions on advertising or 
labelling are at issue, the CJEU relaxes its proportionality review. In Van der Veldt for 
example, the CJEU noted that ‘labelling is one of the means that least restricts the free 
movement of products within the Community’,77 and such measures fulfilled the obligation to 
be ‘not out of proportion to the desired result and … hinder as little as possible the 
importation of products’.78  
 
Thus, one might tentatively conclude that the narrower in scope an advertising measure is, the 
more likely it is to be proportionate, although scope alone is not determinative of 
proportionality. It is apparent that there is a general trend towards a closer and more empirical 
evaluation of the proportionality of Member State public health measures.79 Elsewhere, and 
in relation to alcohol marketing, the CJEU tended to engage less rigorously with 
proportionality in its earlier public health case law80, this appears the case for food marketing 
too – for example in the Douwe Egberts decision in 2004 the CJEU based its proportionality 
analysis partly on an ‘assumption’ of the conceivability of the existence of risk.81 However as 
Shuibhne and Maci demonstrate, the ‘relevance of proof has clearly acquired enhanced 
significance in more recent free movement case law’.82 Their analysis, published in 2013, has 
been further strengthened by the CJEU’s decision in Scotch Whisky of December 2015, in 
which the CJEU engaged in some detail with the evidence submitted.  
 
Member States wishing to implement the WHO Recommendations should pay close attention 
to the application of proportionality in Scotch Whisky. The Court appeared to ask whether 
MUP ‘offered anything more towards the achievement of the legitimate objective than the 
alternatives’,83 rather than whether the alternatives would be as effective as MUP. This subtle 
shift in emphasis is important, as it appears to generate an evidentiary burden on Member 
States that is at odds with the margin of discretion doctrine that has been espoused by the 
Court in most of its previous public health case law.84  Nevertheless, the CJEU did clarify that 
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Member States do not have to ‘prove, positively, that no other conceivable measure could 
enable the legitimate objective pursued to be attained under the same conditions’,85 but rather 
must demonstrate that it ‘may reasonably be concluded from the evidence submitted’86 that 
the chosen measure is appropriate and necessary.  
 
Member States should note that this does not necessarily mean demonstrating that advertising 
alone will reverse growing childhood obesity rates. This would be simply impossible as there 
is no ‘magic bullet’ able to solve the problem: effective strategies will need to be multi-
pronged.87 The General Court showed in Dextro Energy that the EU judicial institutions are 
increasingly aware of the confluence of evidence supporting action on obesity prevention,88 
and the Scotch Whisky decision showed that the EU judiciary is aware that public health 
strategies are often comprised of multiple interlinking policies.89 Member States should, 
however, ensure that they approach the justification of controls on unhealthy food marketing 
with a clear idea of what the precise public health objectives of said marketing controls are, 
and how the evidence base supports their adoption. Fortunately for Member States, an ideal 
starting point for this is provided by the WHO Recommendations themselves, and other 
WHO reports and strategies concerning childhood obesity, as other contributions in this 
Special Issue have highlighted.  
 
Member States should be further encouraged by the way in which the CJEU’s has developed 
its jurisprudence on the proportionality of measures where the protection of children’s health 
is specifically at stake. In earlier public health and consumer protection case law, even that 
which specifically concerned measures designed to protect children, the CJEU paid little 
attention to the nature of the public health interest being pursued. For instance, in De Agostini 
the Court acknowledge that ‘the protection of consumers in general are overriding 
requirements of general public importance’,90 but declined to mention the protection of 
children specifically. In Muller, which concerned prohibitions on food additives, the CJEU 
noted evidence from the French government that children were major consumers of products 
likely to be contain allegedly harmful additives, however went no further in factoring the 
protection of children specifically into its decision on proportionality.91 Even in its tobacco 
judgements at the turn of the century, the protection of children’s health was absent from the 
analysis of proportionality.92  
 
However, the CJEU has given more attention recently to specific populations targeted by 
health protection measures. In Pillbox 38 judgement, the CJEU noted that ‘young people who 
are particularly sensitive to advertising’93 would be exposed to fewer promotional messages 
as a result of a general ban on electronic cigarette advertising – an outcome that did not 
exceed the limits of what is necessary to protect public health. In Solgar Vitamin’s, a certain 
level of public health protection that is ‘appropriate for a specific group of consumers, such 
as children’, could be applied to the whole population as long as the measure is ‘limited to 
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what is necessary to protect the health of the persons belonging to that group’.94 Further 
tobacco case law reflects clear concern for the protection of children’s health.95 This more 
recent jurisprudence potentially indicates that measures specifically crafted to afford a high 
level of protection to young people might be more likely to be seen as necessary to protect 
public health.  
 
C. Implications of our analysis for the reconciliation of WHO commitments and 
internal market obligations 
 
What are the implications of the foregoing analysis for Member States seeking to implement 
the WHO Recommendations on food marketing to children? The Court’s case law establishes 
that Member States must demonstrate, though the use of evidence, that trade-restrictive 
marketing measures adopted to implement the WHO Recommendations are necessary and 
appropriate to achieve the legitimate objective of protecting public health, if they are to 
comply with EU free movement law. Furthermore, the more stringent the restriction, the 
heavier the burden of proof on Member States will be. Given that the Recommendations call 
for strong controls on marketing, Member States must be prepared to mount a rigorous 
defence of any such measures that they adopt. This is very likely to happen, despite the 
unanimous recognition by the World Health Assembly that such measures should be adopted: 
one can learn from the many challenges that tobacco manufacturers have mounted against the 
implementation by States of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. However, it is 
precisely this fact that should embolden Member States to implement the WHO 
Recommendations, and which should put them on the front foot when articulating the 
evidence that  to support their regulatory choices. The earlier they frame their policies in light 
of existing evidence, the more likely they are to succeed in defending industry-led challenges. 
 
Member States should not therefore refrain from placing the strongest of restrictions upon 
unhealthy food marketing to protect child health. The CJEU’s case law indicates that if 
Member States can provide evidence to demonstrate that their measures are necessary, then 
these measures will be proportionate and therefore compatible with the EU Treaty. Nothing in 
the CJEU’s case law indicates that the stringency of a measure alone will be fatal in 
determining its proportionality. Should Member States restrict unhealthy food marketing as 
comprehensively as possible in light of WHO Recommendations 2 and 3, the key issue for 
them will be supplying the CJEU with evidence which will demonstrate that preventing 
adults from being exposed to certain marketing messages for unhealthy food is necessary in 
order to protect children from the damaging effects that exposure to those marketing 
messages have on their health. Member States should therefore present the evidence base 
supporting the implementation of the WHO Recommendations as clearly and unequivocally 
as possible. Since Scotch Whisky, it is evident that the CJEU is willing to engage in closer 
proportionality reviews of national public health measures, placing more emphasis on 
evidence than it used to.  
 
Finally, Member States should be encouraged to place greater emphasis on the influence that 
the Recommendations themselves play in their decision to adopt trade-restrictive marketing 
measures. We might note with optimism that the CJEU has elsewhere in its recent case law 
begun to place greater emphasis on the external public health commitments of the Member 
States. For example, in its recent case law upholding the validity of the Tobacco Products 
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Directive, the CJEU made specific mention of the guidelines drawn up to support the 
implementation the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control. It stated that while the 
guidelines are non-binding they are intended to assist the adoption of measures in accordance 
with the FCTC,96 and are ‘are based on the best available scientific evidence and the 
experience of the Parties … and have been adopted by consensus’,97 and as such ‘are 
intended to have a decisive influence on the content of the rules adopted in the area under 
consideration’.98 This might be considered encouraging for Member States seeking to use the 
WHO Recommendations as a basis upon which to implement stricter marketing measures:  
while the WHO Recommendations are not, by nature, legally binding, they are nonetheless 
based on accumulated scientific evidence on the harmful impact of unhealthy food marketing 
on children, they have been adopted by unanimous consent, and they are intended to guide 
state action in the field of obesity prevention. Therefore, the potential role of the WHO 
Recommendations themselves in influencing the direction of the proportionality analysis 
should not be overlooked.99  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Considering that most food and beverage marketing is conducted by multinational 
corporations with global supply chains and international reach,
100
 the EU would seem in a 
much better position to tackle the harmful impact that unhealthy food marketing has on 
children’s health by harmonising the laws of the Member States, rather than leaving them to 
grapple with the issue individually. However, in the absence of any political will at EU level 
to effectively limit the exposure of children to unhealthy food marketing, it is imperative that 
Member States use their discretion to exceed the minimum (and minimal!) standards set at 
EU level to ensure that they comply with their international commitment to protect children 
from the impact of such marketing and therefore try and halt the rise of childhood obesity by 
2025. In doing so, they should be mindful of the process through which they may have to 
justify the adoption of national restrictions on unhealthy food marketing, if such restrictions 
could fall within the scope of EU internal market law and may, as such, restrict the free 
movement of goods or services.  
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